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Food safety shocks can threaten the health of consumers, create havoc within an 
industry and result in severe losses to producers.  Governments often attempt to enhance 
food safety by mandating standards and inspection of food products to supplement the 
voluntary efforts by private firms.  This paper assesses a form of collective action that 
falls between typical government mandates and purely private action.  The California 
pistachio industry recently established a U.S. federal marketing order.  This order sets 
quality standards and requires inspection and certification, aiming to reduce the 
likelihood of dangerous or poor quality pistachios being sold to consumers and to provide 
some quality assurance to consumers.  Simulation results indicate that, across the full 
range of parameters used in the analysis, the benefit-cost analysis was always favorable 
to the new policy.  Continuing work is extending the analysis to account for some 
particular features of the pistachio industry, to consider alternative policies, and to draw 
inferences for the application of similar policies to other California specialty crops.  
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 Demand Enhancement through Food-Safety Regulation: Benefit-Cost Analysis of 
Collective Action in the California Pistachio Industry 
 
1.  Introduction  
In August 2005, the U.S. pistachio industry, one of the youngest, fastest-growing specialty 
crop industries located almost entirely in California, implemented a federal marketing order that would 
mandate quality standards and an inspection program to assure consistency in the quality of California 
pistachios.  The main provisions of the marketing order set standards and require the testing for toxins 
called aflatoxins that are produced by fungi (Apergillus flavus and Aspergillis parasiticus) and have 
been found in a wide range of commodities used for animal and human consumption.  Proponents 
argued that the marketing order would increase consumer confidence and reduce the chance of an 
aflatoxin event in the pistachio market, and thereby stimulate demand and enhance consumer benefits 
and producer returns.   
In this paper we summarize the issues and the results from a study that is reported more fully in 
a monograph and book chapter (Gray et al. 2004; Alston et al. 2005).  We briefly discuss the food 
safety issues that led to the development of the marketing order for pistachios.  We then turn to the 
economic rationale for an industry, in this case the California pistachio industry, to act collectively and 
ask the government to impose additional regulations on it.  We then present our analysis of its costs 
and benefits for producers, consumers and society as a whole.  In a final section we discuss work in 
progress, which is extending the current analysis in several dimensions, including a consideration of 
the potential for application of similar policies to other specialty crops.  This ongoing work will be 
completed by mid-2006, and will be incorporated into a revision and extension of this paper. 
2.  Food-Safety Issues and Aflatoxins in Pistachios  
Concern about aflatoxins was the main issue behind the new marketing order.  An event of 
aflatoxin poisoning in pistachios or some other product, or simply concern about the possibility of 
  1such an event, could have adverse effects on demand.
1  Many produce-related food scares have 
occurred in recent years.  For the period from 1990 to 1999, the Center for Science in the Public 
Interest (CSPI) lists 55 cases in the United States alone.  The main event that directly related to 
pistachios occurred in Europe.  Iranian pistachio imports were banned in the European Union in 
September 1997 because shipments exceeded allowed levels of aflatoxins (Economist, 1997).  The ban 
lasted for nearly three months, and was lifted in December of 1997 (European Commission: Food and 
Veterinary Office).  However, the demand for pistachios was affected for a longer period.  The Food 
and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) presents data showing that aggregate 
imports into the European Union, including those from the United States, the main alternative source, 
fell about 40 percent from 102,698 metric tons in 1997 to 59,619 metric tons in 1998.  
3.  Rationale for Collective Action in Pistachio Markets 
Mandated collective action programs, such as the California Pistachio Commission and the 
federal marketing order for California pistachios, use the coercive powers of the state or federal 
government to oblige individual producers to participate and pay assessments.  The programs are 
voluntary in the sense that their establishment requires the support of a sufficiently large majority of 
producers, but they do not require unanimous support; and consumers, who pay a portion of the costs, 
do not have voting rights.  Even among producers, unlike truly voluntary collective action programs, 
such as cooperatives or clubs, once they have been established, these programs are mandatory for all 
producers of the commodity in the defined area.   
                                                 
1 Aflatoxicosis is poisoning that results from ingestion of aflatoxins in contaminated food or feed.  Depending on the 
levels, the toxins can severely affect the liver and they are a known human carcinogen. The most pronounced 
contamination has been encountered in tree nuts, peanuts, and other oilseeds, including corn and cottonseed.  Aflatoxicosis 
in humans has rarely been reported; however, such cases are not always recognized. In many developing countries 
aflatoxin contamination is a major health risk to humans and animals due to the high levels of contaminated product 
consumed. In rich countries, aflatoxin contamination rarely occurs in foods at levels that cause acute aflatoxicosis in 
humans, but there have been important aflatoxin events affecting pistachios.  (Information here is taken from 
http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/~mow/chap41.html .) 
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and regulatory powers in this fashion is that there are collective goods within the industry – research, 
promotion, grade standards, packing regulations, public relations, and the like – that will be 
undersupplied otherwise.  In practice, whether the pistachio marketing order will yield net benefits to 
producers, consumers, the state, and the nation as a whole, will depend on the nature and extent of 
external costs and benefits when individual firms are compelled to comply with minimum quality 
standards and mandatory testing for aflatoxin, along with the other provisions of the order, and the 
costs of implementing the program.  
The regulations under the marketing order include various elements that have different types of 
collective-good characteristics, some more easily justified than others.  Standardized grades and 
packaging have a collective-good role in that they will reduce transaction costs (e.g., see Freebairn 
1967, 1973).  An argument for quality regulation can be made where quality is hidden and the market 
can be spoiled as a result of the distortions in incentives to provide and communicate information 
about quality (e.g., Akerlof 1970).  The externality aspect is that when consumers experience the 
quality of pistachios from one supplier, this affects their subsequent demand for pistachios from other 
suppliers as well.  Thus a bad experience associated with any pistachios can affect the whole industry 
and the impacts can be large and long lasting, but individual producers will not take these industry-
wide consequences of their actions entirely into account.   
An industry-wide food safety issue could arise as a result of evidence of death or illness 
associated with consumption of pistachios containing aflatoxin.  As with other food scares, there may 
be consequences for demand experienced throughout the industry, not just by the firms directly 
responsible for the incidents in question.  The same type of market problem can arise even without a 
case of actual food poisoning.  It could result from an actual aflatoxin event involving the discovery of 
aflatoxin in excess of the 20 parts per billion allowed by the Food and Drug Administration.  Even in 
  3the absence of an aflatoxin event in pistachios, there may be adverse effects on the pistachio market 
from the perception of such a threat – for example, based on adverse publicity associating aflatoxin 
with pistachios or for some other reason, such as when excess amounts are discovered in other 
products in the United States or anywhere else in the world.  Negative consequences could result from 
negative perceptions among final consumers resulting in their choosing not to purchase products, 
negative perceptions among market middlemen such as retailers resulting in their choosing not to 
stock a product that might be subject to recall or lawsuits, or from governments choosing not to allow 
products to be sold because of heightened concerns over food safety.  
Perceptions of a food quality problem are not specific to individual suppliers, but affect the 
industry in a collective way.  Therefore, the private incentive to assure high quality nuts that are 
perceived as safe does not reflect the full, industry-wide or public benefit of these actions.  In such 
cases, voluntary actions, motivated by private incentives will provide less safety and quality assurance 
than would be in the interest of the industry (and, perhaps, the general consuming public).  In this case, 
all farms and firms would benefit from a stronger reputation for pistachios in general, but their own 
actions cannot assure such a reputation, unless the rest of the industry matches those actions.  
Individual farms and firms have the private incentive to keep their own direct costs low and invest less 
in safety testing and quality assurance than would be optimal from the view of the whole market, 
giving rise to a free-rider problem.  
Collective action or government mandates are not always necessary to achieve socially optimal 
food quality and safety assurance.  The use of private brands combined with product liability laws is 
one way of internalizing within firms the benefits and costs of their investments in food safety and 
food safety assurance.  The extent to which these factors reduce externalities and market failures in 
any particular setting will depend on the extent to which instances of food poisoning and its human 
health consequences can be observed and traced to particular sources, and the extent to which 
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foods.  Such incentives seem to work well for large food retail chains, for instance, for whom brand 
name and reputation are very valuable, but perhaps not as well in more atomistic industries.   
Two characteristics of the pistachio market make the market failure concerns particularly 
important in the context of food safety assurances and quality standards.  First, as with many fresh 
fruits and nuts, there is little brand identification with pistachios.  Thus, a customer who has an 
unsatisfying experience with a purchase of pistachios or who hears negative news about the safety of 
consuming pistachios is unlikely to associate this with a specific brand or supplier.  Unlike branded, 
packaged consumer items, any negative news would not just affect a specific supplier, but rather 
would affect the industry at large.  Second, many pistachio purchasers consume the product 
infrequently, purchase relatively small quantities, and have relatively little knowledge about 
pistachios.  One would therefore expect the industry-wide reaction to an aflatoxin event in pistachios 
to be large, compared with more familiar foods, especially in the context of food safety concerns.  The 
wholesale trade would be even more sensitive to an event if a recall were necessary.  Consequently, 
the pistachio industry has strong in-principle reasons for acting collectively to assure industry-wide 
compliance with quality and food safety standards.  But this is only an in-principle case.  Whether 
collective action of this type would provide net benefits to the industry depends also on how effective 
the program would be in reducing the likelihood of a food scare, or its severity, and on the costs of the 
program.  
4.  A Model of the Industry and the Impacts of the Marketing Order 
We developed a multi-period stochastic dynamic simulation model and used it to simulate the 
markets for California pistachios and project production, prices, and allocation of pistachios for 50 
years, beginning in the year 2000.  Yields vary over time to reflect alternate bearing and random 
influences.  Aflatoxin events also occur at random.  In our model, both the probability of an event and 
  5the severity of the demand response to a given event are lower with the marketing order in place.  For 
each “draw” of a time series of future yields, we simulated the outcomes for economic variables in the 
industry with and without the marketing order in place.  By considering 100 draws of future time paths 
of yields, we were able to estimate the effects of the marketing order on measures of interest, for 
average values and the range of outcomes (or other measures of variability).  
We specified equations representing the domestic and export demands for pistachios, including 
storage demand, using estimates of elasticities and data on market shares, quantities and prices.  The 
marketing order applies solely to the domestic market.  It imposes regulations, which entail costs of 
compliance with requirements for aflatoxin testing and meeting quality standards, borne in the first 
instance by processors, and other (relatively minor) costs to be financed by an assessment on 
processors.  Based on interviews with processors we find that the weighted cost of compliance, which 
varies among processor depending on size and extent to which testing is already done, is $0.0035 per 
pound across the entire California pistachio production.   
The potential increases in demand, on average, relative to a scenario without a marketing order 
include the effects of (1) a reduced probability of a negative shock to demand associated with an 
aflatoxin event, and a reduction in the size of the negative shock associated with a given event, and (2) 
an increase in demand in every year owing to greater consumer confidence in the product and greater 
buyer confidence in the product associated with the USDA testing and certification.   
To calibrate the potential effects of a pistachio food scare we used information from other 
produce-related food scares in the United States, along with information from an event involving 
pistachios in Germany, and we conducted sensitivity analyses in which we varied the relevant 
parameters.  Based on that approach we assumed that an aflatoxin event in the domestic market for 
U.S. pistachios in year t would cause a 30 percent reduction in demand in the year of the event (i.e., δt 
= 0.3, where δ stands for the proportion by which demand decreases in year t).  The German evidence 
  6suggests that the negative demand effects from a single aflatoxin event would continue to affect 
demand for several years.  In the model the negative demand shock decays at a rate of 30 percent per 
year (i.e., δt+n = 0.7
nδt).   
Aflatoxin events do not happen every year, but the market always faces some probability of a 
food scare.  The marketing order cannot eliminate the chance of a food scare associated with aflatoxin 
in pistachios, but it does have provisions that make such an event less likely.  The benefit from 
additional testing is a reduction of the probability of an aflatoxin event or food scare.  For the 
counterfactual base case of no mandatory testing, we used an annual probability of 4 percent of an 
outbreak that affects demand as specified above.  We assumed that with mandatory testing the chance 
of an aflatoxin outbreak would fall to 2 percent and that the events, when they do occur, would have 
smaller effects on demand.  We assumed an initial downward shock of 15 percent with a marketing 
order rather than the 30 percent that would apply otherwise.  The demand for pistachios might be 
greater as a result of the official USDA certification ensuring a good quality product.  To reflect this 
certification effect we allowed for a small increase in demand in every year, relative to the base case, 
in response to the introduction of the marketing order: an increase in U.S. consumers’ willingness to 
pay for pistachios equal to 1 cent per pound (about 1 percent of recent prices). 
5.  Benefit-Cost Analysis  
To estimate the impact of the marketing order we computed and compared a pair of fifty-year 
simulations (i.e., one with and one without the marketing order) using the “baseline” values for the 
parameters, as shown in Table 1.  For each year of the fifty-year simulation, the model determines a 
market clearing price, bearing acres, acres planted, yield, production, domestic quantity demanded, 
export quantity demanded, ending stocks, revenue, and consumer surplus.  To capture the effects of 
random yield variability and aflatoxin-related demand shocks, the 50 years of simulated equilibrium 
values were calculated for a set of 250 equally likely futures, which differ in terms of values for 
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of interest has a fifty-year time path, with a random distribution in each period that is affected by the 
marketing order.  As the summary statistics and average impacts are reported below it is important to 
keep this time path and the random nature of the variables in mind.
2  
The impacts of the marketing order are reported in the first column of numbers in Table 2.  To 
summarize the effects of the marketing order over the 50-year simulation we report average effects 
over the 50 years for some variables and for others we report the net present value in 2003 of the 
effects over the 50 years.  The policy would modestly increase the average price received by growers 
(by 0.5 cents per pound, or 0.6 percent), along with the average number of bearing acres (by 1,870 
acres or 1.3 percent) and production (by 12.6 million pounds per year or 1.5 percent).  These increases 
in production are associated generally with increases in domestic consumption (by 11.5 million 
pounds per year or 2.8 percent) and in exports (by 1.0 million pounds per year or 0.2 percent) and 
decreases in stocks (by 0.6 million pounds per year or 0.3 percent).  These averages mask the fact that, 
as noted above, the effects on some of these variables change over time both because of trends (the 
production response to the policy increases with time whereas the domestic demand response begins 
immediately) and from year to year (through the interaction of policy-induced changes in bearing 
acreage and variable yields).  This is true in particular for the effects of the policy on exports – the 
small average effects reflect negative impacts in some years, especially initially, and positive impacts 
in others, especially in the later years.  
The dynamics of the impact of the marketing order on revenue per bearing acre, bearing acres, 
and domestic consumer surplus are particularly interesting.  The marketing order increases grower 
price and revenue per acre by increasing consumer confidence and reducing the odds and the impact of 
                                                 
2 Further details on the simulation model and alternative parameterizations may be found in the more comprehensive full 
report on the study (Gray et al. 2004). 
  8an aflatoxin event.  The impact on revenue is greatest in the first few years after the introduction of the 
marketing order because supply is unaffected for this period of time.  The increase in revenue per acre 
eventually causes an increase in the time path of bearing acres.  The increase in bearing acres results in 
increased production, driving down prices and revenue per acre, and dissipating the benefits for 
producers.  Consumers gain initially from the improved food safety and these benefits are then 
augmented by the subsequent reductions in prices resulting from the increases in production.  
The net benefits from the policy – reflecting the consequences of both the assessment and 
regulations, and the demand and supply responses to them – are expressed as present values (in 2003) 
of changes in economic surplus accruing to different groups.  These net benefits include $68.9 million 
to domestic producers and $165.4 million to domestic consumers, yielding a total national net benefit 
of $234.2 million.
3  From a global perspective, the U.S. net benefits are slightly offset by net losses in 
foreigner surplus (the “consumer surplus” measured off the demand for U.S. exports) worth $25.0 
million, leaving global net benefits with a present value in 2003 equal to $209.2 million.
4  
We also estimated the total cost of the policy (in terms of expenditure incurred by processors in 
compliance), which had a present value in 2003 of $36.7 million.  The initial incidence of this cost is 
on processors, but this incidence is redistributed over time through supply and demand responses.  To 
evaluate the final incidence, we ran a simulation with just the assessment (modeled as a reduction in 
domestic buyers’ willingness to pay of 0.525 cents per pound) and, in present value terms, we found 
                                                 
3 On 78,000 bearing acres in 2001, the producer benefit is worth $2,120 per acre, but the benefits would not be confined to 
these acres. 
 
4 The positive effect on export quantity seems to contradict the higher average price and the reduction in foreign 
“consumer” surplus associated with the policy.  The effect on foreign “consumer” surplus is complicated.  First, there are 
some benefits to foreigners from the policy because in the baseline, there is a spillover of an aflatoxin event from U.S. 
demand to foreign demand and the policy-induced reduction in probability and severity of an aflatoxin event applies to 
export markets as well as domestically.  These benefits are offset at least somewhat by the larger domestic demand 
responses, driving up prices, especially in the early years; in the later years those effects in turn are offset at least somewhat 
by the consequences of U.S. supply response to the policy.  The benefits to foreigners are greater in the earlier years, and 
given discounting, the net present value is negative even though the average effect on the quantity of exports, 
undiscounted, is slightly positive. 
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combined, and 95 percent by domestic consumers (foreign consumers are net beneficiaries of a tax on 
domestic consumers).  Hence the incidence of the global cost of $36.7 million was $39.7 million on 
the United States, including $5.5 million on U.S. producers.  By dividing each measure of net benefits 
by the corresponding measure of the incidence of the costs we obtained a ratio of net benefits to costs 
(i.e., (B-C)/C) to which we added one to compute conventional benefit-cost ratios (B/C) for domestic 
producers (13.5), the United States (6.9) and the world (6.7).  
To examine the general sensitivity of results to modeling assumptions, we devised a “high-
impact” scenario and a “low-impact” scenario, and the summary results for the simulations under 
these scenarios are reported in second and third columns of numbers in Table 2.  The benefit-cost 
ratios are all well greater than zero, even in the low-impact scenario, indicating that the policy entails 
substantial net benefits for both producers and the nation as a whole.  
6.  Results and Implications  
An aflatoxin event could impose serious costs on the California pistachio industry.  The 
marketing order is intended to reduce the odds of an event, to mitigate the consequences if an event 
should occur, and to provide some quality assurance to buyers so as to offset the negative 
consequences of concerns over the potential for a food scare affecting pistachios.  In this study we 
have modeled the market for California pistachios to provide an ex ante assessment of the benefits and 
costs and other consequences of the marketing order looking forward for 50 years from its 
introduction.  Our approach uses a stochastic, dynamic simulation of the industry, under scenarios 
with and without the proposed marketing order in place, to compare the stream of simulated outcomes 
and the consequences for measures of economic welfare of producers in the industry, consumers, the 
nation as a whole, and globally.   
  10To assess the implications of the marketing order required incorporating into the simulation a 
number of parameters representing the odds of an aflatoxin event, its consequences for demand, and 
the extent to which a marketing order would reduce those magnitudes.  Many of these parameters are 
hard to estimate because relevant historical data are not available on pistachios.  As well as simulating 
the consequences implied by “best-guess” values for key parameters, we undertook sensitivity 
analysis.  Across the full range of parameters used in the analysis, the benefit-cost analysis was always 
favorable to the policy: the measured benefits to producers, the nation, or the world always well 
exceeded the corresponding measure of costs, typically by many times.  The benefit-cost ratios were 
generally greater than 5:1 and often greater than 10:1, which means there is substantial leeway to 
accommodate potential errors in assumptions and yet have favorable findings.  In present value terms, 
the benefits to producers were estimated at $68.9 million.  Two-thirds of the benefits, $165.4 million 
would accrue to domestic consumers.  These are significant values, and are large relative to the cost of 
compliance with the program, which is a very small amount – about half of one percent of the current 
value of domestic sales. 
7.  Further Issues  
A number of questions remain unanswered about whether the regulatory provisions under the 
marketing order for California pistachios provide the most appropriate correction for the information 
problems they are meant to address.  Similar questions may arise in other industries that might 
contemplate similar policies.  The essential issue with food safety and safety assurance is one of 
information.  If food safety were visibly obvious to consumers or easily detected, there would be no 
problem.  Even when food safety is invisible (the more relevant case), if a case of food poisoning 
could be traced to its source with certainty, and firms could be made fully liable for the costs, then 
incentives would work and government intervention would be unnecessary.   
  11Continuing work under this project is exploring further aspects of safety assurance for 
California pistachios, and alternative policies or private actions that might be used to address the 
particular information problems in the pistachio market, such as (a) public education, (b) alternative 
mandated grading requirements, or (c) a mandated requirement to identify products with a brand.   
Of relevance to this discussion is the observation that pistachio safety is at least to some extent 
visible and avoidable (such that the risk of aflatoxin poisoning can be reduced by educating consumers 
about the existence of the risk and how to avoid it by inspecting the nuts and by advising them not to 
eat nuts that taste bad).  Policies designed to correct market failures associated with invisible quality 
seem inappropriate in such a setting.  Rather than mandating inspection policies and grade standards, 
the government could require firms (a) to grade out nuts that are discolored or have other external 
evidence that might suggest a risk of aflatoxin contamination prior to sale (perhaps using optical 
sorters), and (b) to provide information with products about safe approaches to consuming them.  A 
role for the government here could be in developing the information resources and in obliging firms, 
across the range of related industries, to provide the appropriate, balanced, information.  This is a 
solution that the industry might not favor, since rather than encourage consumption it might cause 
some consumers to become less-confident in the safety of the product, and the extent to which 
consumers would absorb and act on information provided in this fashion is open to question. 
A second pertinent observation is the so-called “one-nut” problem, associated with the discrete 
nature of the nut, the disease, and the samples used to test for it.  In the case of pistachios, a single nut 
(out of many thousands) might contain sufficient aflatoxin to be very dangerous, and pistachios are 
consumed as single nuts.  Quality assessments based on small samples rest on an assumption that the 
sample is representative, and that may not be the case.  The power of the tests for pistachio safety 
based on small samples may be very low, and reducing the maximum standard might not enhance the 
actual safety much.  In future work we will use data from the inspections under the marketing order 
  12and other information on the distribution of aflatoxin problems among pistachios to delve more deeply 
into the extent to which inspection programs actually increase food safety in the case of products like 
pistachios that are consumed as discrete units.  From this work we will re-examine the appropriate 
values for parameters to reflect the effects of the policy on the odds of an event and quality assurance.  
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  13Table 1: Key Parameters for the Simulation Model 
Parameter  Baseline 
Value 
Underlying Market Conditions   
  Elasticity of domestic demand   -1.00 
  Elasticity of export demand   -3.30 
  Elasticity of demand for stocks  -2.00 
  Long-run annual growth rate of demand (percent)  3.60 
  Elasticity of new plantings response to profitability  1.00 
   
Impact Parameters without a Marketing Order   
  Probability of an aflatoxin event (percent per year)  4.00 
  Initial impacts of an event (percentage reduction in domestic demand)  30.00 
  Foreign demand shock/ domestic demand shock (percent)  21.50 
   
Impact Parameters with a Marketing Order   
  Probability of an aflatoxin event (percent per year)  2.00 
  Initial impacts of an event (percentage reduction in domestic demand)  15.00 
  Initial impacts of an event (percentage reduction in foreign demand)  21.50 
  Compliance costs (cents per pound)  0.525 
  Domestic demand enhancement from certification (cents per pound)  1.00 
   
 
  14Table 2: Simulation Results: Benefit-Cost Analysis of the Pistachio Marketing Order 




Average of Annual Values, 2000-2050, Induced Changes in      
Price of California pistachios (real cents per pound)  0.501  0.726  0.371 
Bearing area of California pistachios (acres)  1,866  2,716  1,279 
Production of California pistachios (million pounds)  12.55  18.31  8.63 
Domestic consumption of California pistachios (million pounds)  11.54  16.91  8.15 
Exports of California pistachios (million pounds)  1.01  1.40  0.51 
Stocks of California pistachios (million pounds)  -0.62  -1.05  -0.47 
 
Present Values in Year 2000, Net Benefits, $million     
Changes in U.S. consumer surplus (CS)  165.4  246.7  109.8 
Changes in California producer surplus (PS)  68.9  103.7  49.6 
National benefits (NS = CS+PS)  234.3  350.4  159.4 
Net changes in foreign surplus (FS)  -25.0  -36.5  -19.2 
Global net benefits (GS = NS+FS)  209.3  313.9  140.2 
 
Present Values in Year 2003, Costs of Marketing Order, $million     
Cost of compliance (CC)  36.7 34.9 38.4 
 
Benefit-Cost Ratios     
Global B/C ratio (1+ [GS/CC])  6.7  10.0  4.7 
National B/C ratio (1 + [NS/1.1CC])  6.9  10.2  4.8 
Grower B/C ratio (1+ PS/0.15CC])  13.5  20.8  9.6 
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